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This paper examines the eﬀect of Korea’s fair disclosure regulation on the
timeliness and informativeness of earnings announcements. The present regu-
lation for Korean listed ﬁrms requires that if a company’s sales revenue, oper-
ating income (or loss) and net income (or loss) have changed by over 30%
compared to the prior year, the ﬁrm must disclose this information through
a preliminary ﬁnancial report (PFR) even before the company is audited by
external auditors. To analyze the eﬀects of this policy, we ﬁrst investigate
the timeliness of preliminary ﬁnancial report disclosures. We examine the
extent to which Korean listed companies actually comply with the requirement
for prompt notiﬁcation of information concerning material changes in ﬁnan-
cial performance. Second, we investigate the informativeness of preliminary
ﬁnancial reports by analyzing diﬀerential stock market reactions to diﬀerent
timings of preliminary ﬁnancial report disclosures. Our empirical results reveal
that more than half of our sample ﬁrms release their preliminary ﬁnancialurnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of
ier B.V. All rights reserved.
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the advantage of informed investors, withoutreports after external audits are completed, thereby potentially invalidating the
eﬀectiveness of the regulation. In addition, we ﬁnd that preliminary ﬁnancial
reports have information value only if they are disclosed prior to annual audit
report dates. This ﬁnding supports the notion that timeliness increases the
informativeness of preliminary ﬁnancial report disclosure by curbing insiders’
ability to potentially proﬁt from their information advantage.
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In October 2000, the Financial Supervisory Service of Korea (Korean SEC, “FSS”) implemented a fair dis-
closure (FD) regulation for listed ﬁrms. This regulation calls for the public disclosure of preliminary ﬁnancial
reports even before they are audited by external auditors if a ﬁrm’s sales revenue, operating income (or loss)
and net income (or loss) have changed by over 30% compared to the prior year.5,6 Such preliminary ﬁnancial
reports (“PFRs” hereafter) may convey useful information to all investors, even though the reports are not
veriﬁed by an auditor. The aim of this new regulation is to level the playing ﬁeld for all investors by mandating
timely disclosure that pre-empts information advantages for insiders.7 Without such a requirement, market-
sensitive information can be delivered privately (or selectively) to certain enumerated persons (such as secu-
rities market professionals and holders of the issuer’s securities) who may proﬁt from their information advan-
tage (SEC, 2000; Irani and Karamanou, 2003). Brown et al. (2004) show that the frequent and timely
disclosure of material information can reduce the information advantage (asymmetry) of management. These
authors explain that the regular timely release of information makes investors aware of private information
concerning the future earnings of a ﬁrm, which in turn alleviates information asymmetry between management
and outside shareholders.8 Therefore, timely disclosures can aﬀect the informativeness of accounting earnings.
Under the current regulation, however, the PFR has to be released only prior to the public notice date of
the shareholders’ meeting (“public notice date” hereafter), and this date typically comes far later than the audit
report date, when the company receives its audit report from the independent auditors (“audit report date”
hereafter). Consequently, ﬁrms may release PFRs even after the audit report date without violating the reg-
ulation. This is particularly likely when managers have concerns about subsequent changes in earnings after
the completion of the external audit. Managers may face greater disclosure-related legal liability if the actual
ﬁnancial results diﬀer from those disclosed in a PFR, as such reports inevitably involve pro forma ﬁnancial
performance information. Pawlewicz (2011) maintains that ﬁrms may respond to the increased regulatoryegulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD), which requires that ﬁrms release material information
rs simultaneously. The purpose is to prohibit the “selective disclosure” of market-sensitive
institutional investors who may well trade on the basis of the information.
Market Abuse Directive” (MAD) requiring that company managers inform the public of
as soon as possible. (We thank a participant at the CJAR Symposium 2012, Bernard
providing this information.)
e, provide evidence that Reg. FD may be achieving the immediate aim of the regulators.
rice eﬀect associated with the dissemination of analysts’ information is signiﬁcantly lower,
ing is consistent with Reg. FD curtailing the ﬂow of information from managers to analysts.
e the eﬀect of Reg. FD on stock market responses to earnings releases, on the earnings
nt to which corporations voluntarily disclose information. These authors provide evidence
forecast dispersion, but they ﬁnd no evidence of signiﬁcant changes in return volatility.
agers substituting public disclosure for selective disclosure, it also suggests that Reg. FD
ssionals, resulting in the increased production of private information.
) ﬁnd that information asymmetry, as reﬂected in trading costs at earnings announcements,
of stock return volatility suggests that information ﬂows around mandatory earnings
ation came into eﬀect. These results suggest that the SEC has been successful in diminishing
increasing volatility.
Y. Park et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 35–49 37scrutiny of earnings announcements by exerting greater eﬀort to verify their earnings announcement disclo-
sures. Managers and their auditors could therefore delay earnings announcements until after the required date
to review the ﬁgures more intensely and ensure that their announcements are free of errors before their public
release. Consistent with this conjecture, we ﬁnd that more than half of Korean listed companies disclose their
PFRs after the audit report dates (when external audits on ﬁnancial reports are completed), thereby poten-
tially invalidating the eﬀectiveness of the regulation. Obviously, these delays happen because the current reg-
ulation requires that companies release the PFRs only prior to the public notice date.
Griﬃn et al. (2011) ﬁnd that some US companies post their FD ﬁlings well after the due date, thereby gain-
ing unfairly by acting on the FD information prior to public disclosure. Pawlewicz (2011) also examines the
eﬀects of Regulation G on the timeliness of ﬁlings and on the reactions of investors to earnings announcement
press releases.9 He ﬁnds evidence that since Regulation G took eﬀect, companies have taken longer to make
their earnings announcements and that increased regulatory oversight has improved the perceived reliability of
earnings announcements.
This study has two purposes. First, it analyzes the timeliness of PFR disclosures by examining the extent to
which Korean listed companies comply with the fair disclosure regulation and actually issue prompt notiﬁca-
tion of material changes in their ﬁnancial performance. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB,
2010) notes that timeliness is an enhancing qualitative characteristic of ﬁnancial reporting and that more
timely earnings announcements are relevant to market fairness. The second purpose of this study is to empir-
ically investigate the informativeness of PFRs by testing diﬀerential stock market reactions to diﬀerent timings
of PFR disclosures. Understanding the regulation’s eﬀect on timeliness and the informativeness of earnings
announcements is important for preparers, users and regulatory bodies concerned with the relevance and reli-
ability of ﬁnancial reporting.
Our analysis indicates that most Korean companies release PFRs around their audit report dates or their
public notice dates. This ﬁnding suggests that the primary objective of the current fair disclosure regulation
may not be achieved, due to a “regulatory loophole” arising from unwarranted timeliness of disclosure. In
addition, we ﬁnd that PFRs have information value only if they are disclosed prior to audit report dates. This
is consistent with the notion that timeliness increases the informativeness of PFR disclosure by curbing insid-
ers’ ability to potentially proﬁt from their information advantage. In additional analysis, we investigate the
association between ownership concentration and earnings informativeness. Our ﬁndings suggest that owner-
ship structure does not play an important role in determining the marginal eﬀect of timing the disclosure of
PFRs to occur before the audit report date. Even so, a negative coeﬃcient on the “owner’s largest share-
holder” interaction term provides a clue that ﬁrms with highly concentrated share ownership may have lower
earnings informativeness, which is consistent with an entrenchment eﬀect.
Our research makes two main contributions to the literature on the regulation of ﬁnancial markets.
First, although earlier research on Korean ﬁrms examines the eﬀect of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics on cor-
porate disclosure, no previous study on Korean businesses has, to our knowledge, examined the associa-
tion between the fair disclosure of preliminary ﬁnancial reports and stock market reactions. This study
thus tests the link between the timing of PRF releases (i.e., fair disclosure) and security market reactions.
Second, our research contributes to an understanding of the mediating eﬀects of the timeliness of fair dis-
closure in relation to the release of preliminary ﬁnancial reports and security market reactions. Fair dis-
closure has received much attention in the US and the issue has become more signiﬁcant in emerging
markets due to the global rise in cross-border equity investments in recent years. This study also adds
to the literature that examines the role and consequences of fair disclosure in capital markets and the
information environment.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. Sec-
tion 3 discusses current disclosure regulations in Korea. Section 4 describes the empirical speciﬁcations and
sample. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 presents the study’s conclusions.9 Pawlewicz (2011) explains that eﬀective for all earnings announcements made on or after March 28, 2003, Regulation G requires that:
(1) all ﬁrms must furnish their earnings announcement press releases to the SEC on a Form 8-K, and (2) ﬁrms that disclose measures not in
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs), such as pro forma measures, must disclose the “most directly
comparable GAAP ﬁnancial measure,” and reconcile the non-GAAP ﬁgures to the closest GAAP measure.
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Several analytical and empirical studies have examined the eﬀects of fair disclosure requirements on the
information environment and on the quality of the information content disclosed. Ahmed and Schneible
(2007) document that FD has reduced diﬀerences in the quality of information available to investors prior
to earnings announcements, which is consistent with the intent of the regulation for leveling the information
playing ﬁeld. However, this reduction of information inequality is driven mainly by small ﬁrms and high-tech-
nology ﬁrms, not by the large ﬁrms targeted by the SEC. In addition, the regulation has not improved the
average quality of information that investors have prior to earnings announcements for any subset of ﬁrms.
Contrary to the assertions of the SEC, the requirements of FD have worsened the information environment
for some ﬁrms, particularly small or high-tech ﬁrms.
In a related study, Callen et al. (2006) examine the relative value and relevance of information about cash
ﬂows, accruals and expected returns, according to the dates of SEC-required preliminary ﬁnancial reports.
They ﬁnd that news of expected returns and earnings is value-relevant on the dates of preliminary earnings
reports and SEC ﬁling dates, and that news concerning earnings, cash ﬂows and accruals is more value-rele-
vant on the SEC ﬁling dates for 10-K forms than on the ﬁling dates for 10-Q forms. These authors also doc-
ument that three informational components (i.e., news about the ﬁrm’s risk, accruals and cash ﬂows) contain
less value-relevant information at the SEC ﬁling date for ﬁrms with a higher proportion of long-term sophis-
ticated investors than for those with a higher proportion of short-term investors. Extant research also docu-
ments the market reactions to ﬁrms releasing a number of alternative ﬁnancial reports.
Grant (1980) documents that the amount of interim information (as an alternative form of preliminary
information) that is available about OTC ﬁrms in particular may be systematically less than that available
concerning NYSE ﬁrms, which suggests that ﬁrm size is positively related to the tendency to disclose prelimin-
ary information (such as interim information). Grant also ﬁnds that the annual earnings announcements of
OTC ﬁrms appear to oﬀer more information content than those of NYSE ﬁrms, as the timeliness of annual
earnings announcements may be conditional on the amount of interim information available. The results of
Grant’s study suggest that although the accounting numbers presented in the annual earnings announcements
may still be value-relevant, the information content of the numbers is, to a large extent, anticipated by the
market prior to the date of release, due to the existing interim sources of information.
Similarly, Firth (1981), among others, ﬁnds that the week a preliminary announcement is made has the
highest weekly level of “information” exchange, which suggests that preliminary reporting pre-empts insider
trading by putting information into the public domain that would otherwise be privately held. Firth’s results
also indicate that interim reports have high levels of information content.
Opong (1995) extends Firth’s study (1981) by investigating whether the information value of interim reports
is reduced due to reliability problems that might arise because these reports are not subject to third-party cer-
tiﬁcation. The study checks if interim ﬁnancial reports in the UK contain value-relevant information. The
results of the study, however, provide evidence to the contrary, showing that interim ﬁnancial reports do con-
tain information relevant to investment decisions on the days they are released.
Opong (1996) further examines the information content of preliminary annual ﬁnancial reports in the UK
by using hourly share price data. The results indicate that a signiﬁcant price response to the release of annual
preliminary reports occurs in the hour when the reports are released.
For the Korean market environment, Song (1989) examines the information content of voluntary disclo-
sures of preliminary annual ﬁnancial reports by using weekly share price data from the 1986 to 1987 period.
The results indicate that substantial information is conveyed to the stock market by the release of preliminary
annual ﬁnancial reports. However, the information released at annual shareholders’ meetings (which usually
take place about two weeks subsequent to the release of preliminary annual ﬁnancial reports) does not appear
to give signiﬁcant information to investors. Song suggests that the eﬀect reports have on prices is usually con-
ﬁned to the week when the announcements are made.
Jang and Cheon (2003) extend Song’s study (1989) by using daily returns data on a diﬀerent sample and
over a diﬀerent time period. These authors examine the informativeness of voluntary announcements of pre-
liminary earnings by investigating whether they pre-empt market reactions to annual earnings announce-
ments. Their results reveal that stock markets react signiﬁcantly to voluntary preliminary earnings
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ing suggests that the information contained in annual reports is pre-empted by preliminary earnings
announcements.
Both of the abovementioned studies attempt to assess whether the release of ﬁnancial results in the form of
voluntary preliminary announcements provides investors with signiﬁcant value-relevant information. Both
studies suggest that the release of actual earnings ﬁgures at annual shareholders’ meetings does not provide
signiﬁcant additional information, because the earnings announcements are, to a large extent, anticipated
by the market following preliminary announcements.
Previous studies collectively suggest that alternative forms of preliminary information, voluntary or man-
datory, provide value-relevant information around their announcement periods and thus pre-empt the infor-
mativeness of actual earnings announcements. With respect to measuring the degree to which PFRs pre-empt
the actual earnings information, previous studies consider dates related to a ﬁrm’s annual report at its diﬀerent
stages, namely the public notice date (Firth, 1981; Sohn and Lee, 2005) and the date of the annual sharehold-
ers’ meeting (Grant, 1980; Firth, 1981; Song, 1989; Jang and Cheon, 2003). However, these studies fail to iden-
tify the “audit report date” (when the company receives its audit report from the independent auditors) as a
benchmark date for investigating the potential pre-emption of actual earnings information.
We argue that if the purpose of mandatory preliminary earnings announcements (such as PFRs) is to level
the playing ﬁeld for all investors by curbing insiders’ ability to proﬁt from their information advantage, then it
is important to identify the earliest date at which the actual (i.e., audited) earnings are known if we are to
assess the eﬀectiveness of the disclosure regulation. Identifying the earliest benchmark event date is particu-
larly crucial in the absence of a formal test for the existence of insider trading. In this regard, we examine
the market reaction to PFR around the audit report date, as this is deemed to be the earliest announcement
date of actual earnings.3. Current Korean disclosure system
In Korea, the corporation disclosure system is governed by three related rules: commercial law, Securities
and Exchange Act and External Audit Act. These rules specify ﬁling schedules for important ﬁnancial report-
ing events, including PFRs, audit reports to client companies (audit report dates), public notices of sharehold-
ers’ meetings (public notice dates) and ﬁlings of ﬁnal audit reports to shareholders (“ﬁling date of audit
report” hereafter).
According to the present rules, a listed company has to disclose PFRs before its public notice date whenever
its sales revenue, operating income (or loss) and net income (or loss) have changed by over 30% compared to
the prior year.10 To eliminate the possible pre-emption of fair disclosure through potential information leak-
age and/or alternative disclosure sources, there should not be any other signiﬁcant ﬁnancial reporting event
(for example, an audit report date) between the PFR disclosure and the public notice date. The current reg-
ulation, however, requires that independent auditors submit audit reports to their client companies within four
weeks after receiving the client companies’ ﬁnancial statements.11 In addition, companies are required to pro-
vide their ﬁnancial statements to independent auditors six weeks prior to their annual shareholders’
meetings.12
Given that the dates of annual shareholders’ meetings are to be publicly announced only two weeks before
the meetings are held and within three months after their ﬁscal year ends,13 their audit report dates may fall
between their PFR disclosure and public notice dates. This is particularly likely when client companies provide
their ﬁnancial statements to independent auditors shortly after ﬁscal year end. As a result, ﬁrms may release
PFRs even after the audit report date without violating the regulation. This implies that material information
about changes in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance may be selectively disclosed to privileged individuals10 Article 191-10(3), Securities Exchange Act.
11 Article 447-4, commercial law.
12 Article 7, External Audit Act.
13 Article 4-2, Regulations on Listed Companies, Securities Exchange Act.
Fig. 1. Filing schedule for important ﬁnancial reporting events.
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the PFR and invalidating the eﬀectiveness of the fair disclosure regulation.
A summary of ﬁling schedules for important ﬁnancial reporting events of Korean listed companies under
the current regulations is depicted in Fig. 1.
4. Research methods
4.1. Empirical models
To investigate the informational value of PFR content, we ﬁrst analyze the cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) that accrue to shareholders around the date of the public release of the reports. From the KOSPI
or the KOSDAQ equally weighted market index,14 we obtain market model parameters that are measured
over a 75-day period beginning 100 days prior to each event date. Once the parameters are estimated, the
abnormal return (AR) for each sample ﬁrm is estimated for the announcement period that includes the
announcement date (day 0) and the other days of interest (e.g., “day +1” after the announcement date) using
the following equation:14 KO
respecARjt ¼ Rjt  a^j  b^jRmt ¼ ejt;
where Rjt is the realized return of ﬁrm j at time t; Rmt is the realized return on a market index (e.g., the KOSPI
index) at time t; and aj, bj = parameters of the regression equation.
The CAR is the sum of abnormal returns for each sample ﬁrm for the announcement period from day t0 to
day t1, as calculated using the following equation:CARjðt0; t1Þ ¼
Xt1
t¼t0
ARjt:We then examine the informativeness of PFRs by estimating the following regression equation:SPI and KOSDAQ stand for the Korean Composite Stock Price Index and the Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations,
tively.
15 Paw
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where CARjt (1,0,1) is the cumulative abnormal return from “day 1” to “day +1” of ﬁrm j at time t (“day
0” denotes the date of the relevant earnings announcement); PUEjt is the unexpected PFR earnings (PFR NIjt
– actual NIjt1) of ﬁrm j at time t, deﬂated by the beginning market value of equity; DBPFR has a value of 1 if
PFR is disclosed before the audit report date, 0 otherwise; DNEG has a value of 1 if net income is negative, 0
otherwise; SIZE is the beginning market value of equity; and YD represents year dummies.
The test of the information content of the PFRs analyzes the abnormal returns that accrue to shareholders.
If information contained in a PFR is pre-empted by potential information leakage due to the delay of its dis-
closure until after the audit report date, then the parameter of unexpected PFR earnings, a2, is expected to be
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, whereas the dummy interaction term (DBPFR), denoting that the PFR is
released before the audit report date a3, is expected to be positive.
Previous studies provide evidence that the amount of unexpected information conveyed to the market by
actual earnings reports is inversely related to ﬁrm capitalization (Grant, 1980; Firth, 1981; Atiase, 1985; Jang
and Cheon, 2003; Choen et al., 2004; Sohn and Lee, 2005). Thus, we include ﬁrm size (SIZE) to control for the
“size” eﬀect. The model also includes the additional dummy interaction term (DNEG) to control for any dif-
ferential return-earnings association of reported losses (Hayn, 1995; Sohn and Lee, 2005).
4.2. Sample and data
Two databases are used to select the sample for this study. Our sample ﬁrms are drawn from the Korean
Information Service-Financial Analysis System (“KIS-FAS”) database for the period 2001–2009. All non-
ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms that satisfy all of the following criteria are selected: (1) Korean Stock Exchange listing;
(2) ﬁscal year ending December 31; and (3) availability of dates of the relevant ﬁnancial reporting events
including audit report date, public notice date and ﬁling date of the audit report. The dates of relevant ﬁnan-
cial reporting events are obtained from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (“DART”) system of the
Financial Supervisory Service of Korea (Korean SEC, FSS). These requirements provide an initial sample
of 5557 ﬁrm-year observations.
Eliminating ﬁrms that have not issued PFRs leaves 3129 observations. Among these, 319 ﬁrm-year obser-
vations with missing audit dates or public notice dates were deleted. The resulting sample of 2810 ﬁrm-year
observations is used to perform our analysis of the timeliness of PFR reports.
For the sample to test the value of information content in PFRs, we require that sample ﬁrms release PFRs
at least two days before their audit report dates, to ensure that the earnings information contained in PFRs is
not aﬀected by the audit report’s statement of actual earnings. This requirement leaves a ﬁnal sample of 2187
ﬁrm-year observations to test the market reaction to PFR announcements. Table 1 summarizes our sample
selection procedures.
5. Results
5.1. Trend in PFR reporting lag and timeliness of reports
To analyze timeliness in our sample of PFRs, we examine both compliance with the statutory ﬁling deadline
and the number of calendar days between the statutory deadline and the actual disclosure date. For our sam-
ple of 3129 PFRs disclosed during the 2001–2009 period, 1943 sample ﬁrms (62%) released PFRs after the
audit report dates. As discussed earlier, these ﬁrms are not violating the current regulation, as it only requires
that PFRs have to be released prior to the public notice date of the shareholders’ meeting. However, informa-
tion that should be conveyed to all investors by PFRs might be pre-empted by potential private information
delivery to certain enumerated persons.15lewicz (2011) provides similar evidence that earnings announcements have come 5.37 days later for the fourth ﬁscal quarter (i.e.,
ear-end) since the implementation of Regulation G (compared to before Regulation G). In contrast, Griﬃn et al. (2011) show that
gth of time by which companies allegedly exceed FD requirements is quite short – in four cases, only two trading days or less.
Table 1
Description of sample selection procedure.
Total observations on the Korea Information Service-Financial Analysis System (“KIS-FAS”) database and the Data Analysis,
Retrieval and Transfer (“DART”) system on FSS that satisfy all of the following initial sample criteria:
5557
(1) Korean Stock Exchange listing,
(2) Fiscal year ending December 31, and
(3) Availability of dates of relevant ﬁnancial reporting events including audit report date, public notice date and ﬁling date of
the audit report.
Less: Observations without announcements of PFRs (2428)
Sub total 3129
Less: Observations with missing audit dates or public notice dates (319)
Sample used to analyze the timeliness of PFR reports 2810
Less: Observations with PFR releases later than 2 days after the audit report date (623)
Final sample for testing the market reaction to PFR announcements 2187
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which suggests that a nontrivial portion of the sample ﬁrms are violating the current regulation. Furthermore,
we observe 14 companies that disclosed PFRs on or after the ﬁling date of audit reports to shareholders.
Table 2 summarizes the PFR reporting lag compared to related ﬁnancial reporting event dates.
To gain further insight into the trends in PFR timeliness and other related ﬁnancial reporting events, we
analyze the number of calendar days between ﬁnancial statement dates and ﬁve relevant ﬁnancial reporting
events, including the PFR disclosure date, the audit report date, the public notice date, the date that the audit
report is ﬁled and the date of the annual shareholders’ meeting. As shown in Table 3, the average (median)
date of PFR disclosure for the sample period (2001–2009) is 50.71 (52) days after the ﬁscal year-end, but
the average (median) for the audit report date is only 46.37 (46) days after the ﬁscal year-end. This evidence
corroborates our earlier ﬁnding that a signiﬁcant number (about 69%) of sample ﬁrms release PFRs after their
audit report dates. The results of our analyses for individual years exhibit a similar pattern and show that
average audit report dates are two to three days earlier than the PFR disclosure dates.
Taken together, the results of our analysis presented in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the current regulation
for PFRs may not be eﬀective in fulﬁlling its intended main objective of providing a level playing ﬁeld to all
investors by mandating more timely disclosure to curb insiders’ ability to proﬁt from their information advan-
tage. Indeed, any ﬁnancial information released after the audit report date could be potentially based on the
audited ﬁgures and therefore it is no longer preliminary because external auditing processes are substantially
completed at the audit report date.
The question that emerges from the above analysis is why ﬁrm managers show a tendency to disclose PFRs
as late as possible. We conjecture that ﬁrm managers might try to avoid unnecessary disclosure-related legal
liability due to audited ﬁnancial results diﬀering from those announced in PFRs. One way to avoid this risk is
to disclose the PFR after the audit report date. Consistent with this conjecture, the analysis presented in
Table 4 indicates that 884 out of the 3129 ﬁrms (28.3%) over the sample period either overestimated or under-
estimated PFR earnings, compared to those audited. Among ﬁrms that overestimated or underestimated PFR
earnings, 484 ﬁrms overestimated and 400 underestimated their forthcoming actual earnings. This ﬁnding sug-
gests that management tends to announce optimistic preliminary earnings (e.g., Cheon and Sohn, 2005).
5.2. Market tests
5.2.1. Market reaction to unexpected PFR earnings
The information content of PFRs is evaluated using cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the dates
of the public release of the reports. Table 5 shows market reactions to announcements of unexpected net
income in PFRs at diﬀerent timings of their releases to the market. As the ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows,
the coeﬃcient of preliminary unexpected earnings (PUEs) reported in PFRs for the full sample is positive
and signiﬁcant at p < 0.01, suggesting that the stock market may respond to PUE regardless of the timing
of its release. To check this possibility, and more importantly to directly test our hypothesis, we add a dummy
interaction term (DBPUE) to the regression model, which disentangles the marginal eﬀect of the disclosure
timing of PFR before the audit report date as a linear function of unexpected net income announced in PFRs.
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prior to the audit report date, the regression results in the second column of Table 5 shows that the coeﬃcient
on the dummy interaction term is positive and marginally signiﬁcant at p < 0.1. The last two columns of
Table 5 report the results of estimating the regressions after dividing the sample into two groups, based on
whether the timing of PFR disclosure is before or after the audit report date. Consistent with the results of
the full sample reported earlier, the estimated coeﬃcient on unexpected net income for the sub-sample that
releases its PFRs before the audit report date is 0.003 and signiﬁcantly greater than zero at p < 0.01. For
the sub-sample that releases PFRs after the audit report date, the corresponding PUE coeﬃcient of 0.011 is
not statistically greater than zero at conventional levels.
5.2.2. Market reaction to unexpected actual earnings
In this subsection, we provide collaborating evidence that the informativeness of actual earnings reports could be
pre-emptedbyPFRswhen the audit report date is followedby thePFRreleasedate.Togather this evidence,we assess
the market reaction to actual unexpected net income around the audit report date. The regression results for the full
sample, as reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 6, indicate that actual unexpected earnings information has, on aver-
age, no information content. The regression coeﬃcient on actual unexpected earnings (UEs) is positive and not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels. This result is somewhat surprising in that it contradicts the
conventional evidence that earnings announcements convey useful information to the stock market.
Table 6 also indicates that the coeﬃcients on the DBPFRUE and DNOPFRUE interaction terms are not
statistically signiﬁcant, which suggests that actual earnings announcements convey no information to the mar-
ket when the PFR is disclosed before the audit report date or if no PFR is disclosed at all.16 However, the
regression coeﬃcient on the DAPFRUE interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level.
This conﬁrms that the informativeness of unexpected actual net income is warranted only when audit report
dates precede PFR release dates.
5.3. Ownership structure and diﬀerential market reaction to unexpected PFR earnings
The results of our main analysis provide evidence that announcements of unexpected net income in PFRs
are informative only when they are disclosed prior to audit report dates. This result could be due in part to
diﬀerences in ownership structure. Previous studies oﬀer conﬂicting evidence on the relationship between cor-
porate ownership structure and the informativeness of earnings reports. For example, Firth et al. (2007) doc-
ument that ﬁrms in China with highly concentrated share ownership have lower earnings informativeness.
These authors attribute their ﬁnding to an entrenchment eﬀect, in which large shareholders may inﬂuence
ﬁrms to adopt accounting policies that reﬂect the wishes of the large owners rather than the economic sub-
stance of the business transactions. However, Jung and Kwon (2002) provide evidence that among Korean
ﬁrms, earnings reports become more informative as the shareholdings of the owner increase, which supports
the convergence-of-interest hypothesis for large shareholders. Sarikhani and Ebrahimi (2011) also ﬁnd a posi-
tive and meaningful relationship between ownership concentration and earnings informativeness for a sample
of Iranian companies.17 In light of the above conﬂicting evidence, we further examine whether ownership con-
centration is associated with earnings informativeness in PFR releases.
Jung and Kwon (2002) contend that the ownership structure of Korean ﬁrms is characterized by the pre-
dominant role of the owner-largest shareholder. The owner-largest shareholder eﬀectively controls the whole
company by holding a signiﬁcant proportion of its shares. We investigate the association between ownership
concentration and earnings informativeness by adding the interaction term DBPFRPUEjtOWN in Eq. (1).
Following Jung and Kwon (2002), the dichotomous variable OWN is coded as one if the percentage of stocks
held by the owner-largest shareholder is above the median of the sample ﬁrms, and zero otherwise.16 To compare the information content of actual earnings for PFR-releasing ﬁrms with that of non-PFR-releasing ﬁrms, we extend our
sample by adding 680 ﬁrm-year observations on ﬁrms that do not release PFRs. The estimation results for this larger sample are
qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 6.
17 Similarly, Fan and Wong (2002) ﬁnd that the entrenchment eﬀect due to concentrated ownership reduces the informativeness of
reported earnings in Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
Table 2
PFR reporting lag (N = 3129).
Disclosure timing compared to PFR date 22 or less 21 to 15 14 to 8 7 to 1 0 1–7 8–14 15–21 22 or more
Compared to PFR disclosure datea
Audit report date 403 308 422 626 184 677 230 104 175
Public notice date of shareholders’ meeting 13 23 204 355 386 610 471 328 739
Date of annual shareholders’ meetingb 4 3 6 139 486 764 1727
a Number of calendar days between the PFR disclosure date and the day of the audit report, the public notice of shareholders’ meeting
or the annual shareholders’ meeting.
b It is extraordinary that in 13 ﬁrms, the PFR disclosure date is the same as or later than the ﬁling date of the audit report.
Table 3
Timing of ﬁnancial reporting events.
Description Number of ﬁrms Average number
of calendar days
Std. dev. Minimum Median Maximum
PFR disclosure datea 2001 225 49.19 12.60 15 50 80
2002 332 42.48 13.05 13 43 76
2003 331 43.81 12.62 9 43 77
2004 375 42.12 14.20 5 44 72
2005 374 52.97 16.71 11 54 88
2006 357 54.93 16.46 10 58 87
2007 363 56.62 17.13 9 62 85
2008 394 57.88 16.17 11 62 89
2009 378 54.75 17.32 10 56 89
2001  2009 3129 50.71 16.53 5 52 89
Audit report dateb 2001 225 44.82 13.19 14 46 87
2002 332 42.15 12.68 13 42 85
2003 331 42.90 11.33 12 43 79
2004 375 40.71 12.75 9 37 76
2005 374 40.42 12.39 12 40 97
2006 357 45.43 14.56 12 44 84
2007 363 50.95 14.93 17 52 83
2008 394 53.36 13.99 20 54 89
2009 378 54.85 14.49 21 56 84
2001  2009 3129 46.37 14.46 9 46 97
a PFR disclosure date – ﬁnancial statement date.
b Audit report date – ﬁnancial statement date.
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ownership concentration around the release dates. The regression coeﬃcient of the interaction term DBPFR-
PUEjtOWN for the full sample is positive (0.003) but statistically insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding suggests that
ownership structure does not play an important role in determining the marginal eﬀect of disclosing PFRs
before the audit report date (DBPFRPUE). Despite this ﬁnding, a positive coeﬃcient on the owner-largest
shareholder ownership interaction term provides a clue that ﬁrms with highly concentrated share ownership
may have higher earnings informativeness, which is consistent with the convergence-of-interest hypothesis.
The results from dividing the sample into two groups based on the timing of PFR disclosure (before and after
the audit report date) remain qualitatively similar to the results for the full sample.5.4. Alternative market expectation of earnings18
In measuring earnings surprise, we rely on the random walk model in which unexpected earnings is deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between PFR earnings and last year’s net income. This approach may have limitations, in that
the model implicitly assumes that annual reports are the only source of information, which may be acceptable18 We thank Bernard Raﬀournier, again, for pointing out this issue.
Table 4
Overestimation vs. underestimation of PFR earnings (Millions of Korean Won).
Year Description Number of ﬁrms PFR earnings (A) Audited earnings (B) Diﬀerence (A  B)
2001 Overestimated 61 35,897 47,665 11,768
Underestimated 54 112,913 117,711 4798
No diﬀerence 110 44 44 0
2001 Total 225 8739 6745 1994
2002 Overestimated 127 38,340 26,590 11,750
Underestimated 55 18,909 25,176 6267
No diﬀerence 150 92,684 92,684 0
2002 Total 332 65,603 62,349 3253
2003 Overestimated 98 3748 1348 2400
Underestimated 71 44,780 45,468 689
No diﬀerence 162 108,323 108,323 0
2003 Total 331 61,780 61,153 627
2004 Overestimated 92 69,147 68,323 824
Underestimated 70 53,103 54,325 1221
No diﬀerence 213 191,030 191,030 0
2004 Total 375 100,378 100,462 84
2005 Overestimated 32 79,271 59,067 20,204
Underestimated 39 305,099 395,251 90,152
No diﬀerence 303 67,020 67,020 0
2005 Total 374 95,907 104,472 8565
2006 Overestimated 31 115,375 106,468 8907
Underestimated 34 99,817 209,366 109,549
No diﬀerence 292 54,154 54,154 0
2006 Total 357 64,706 75,252 10,546
2007 Overestimated 14 245,576 232,396 13,180
Underestimated 37 94,968 147,457 52,489
No diﬀerence 312 62,852 62,852 0
2007 Total 363 76,379 81,530 5151
2008 Overestimated 11 37,698 6021 31,677
Underestimated 19 86,247 128,455 42,208
No diﬀerence 364 45,617 45,617 0
2008 Total 394 47,493 48,736 1239
2009 Overestimated 18 567,711 429,034 138,676
Underestimated 21 90,511 270,774 180,263
No diﬀerence 339 43,395 43,395 0
2009 Total 378 72,603 76,214 3612
2001  2009 Overestimated 484 86,351 72,156 14,196
Underestimated 400 79,015 118,828 39,813
No diﬀerence 2245 59,558 59,558 0
Total 3129 299,150 326,733 27,583
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Table 6
Market reaction to unexpected actual earnings. Model: CARjt (1,0,1) = a1 + a2UEjt + a3DBPFR (or DAPFR or DNOPFR)UEjt +
a4DNEGUEjt + a5SIZEjt + a68YD + ejt.
Model (n = 2,187) Basic model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.040 (2.33)** 0.046 (1.88)* 0.044 (1.81)* 0.049 (2.17)**
UE 0.002 (0.70) 0.001 (0.12) 0.007 (0.37) 0.002 (0.68)
DBPFRUE 0.003 (0.66)
DAPFRUE 0.013 (2.38)**
DNOPFRUE 0.001 (0.59)
DNEGUE 0.009 (1.80) 0.004 (0.81) 0.008 (1.65) 0.008 (0.05)
SIZE 0.001 (2.06)** 0.001 (1.71)* 0.002 (2.19)** 0.001 (1.99)**
Adj R2 1.35% 0.99% 1.19% 0.96%
CARjt (1,0,1): cumulative abnormal return from “day 1” to “day +1” of ﬁrm j at time t (“day 0” denotes audit report date).
UEjt: unexpected actual earnings (actual NIjt – actual NIjt1) of ﬁrm j at time t deﬂated by beginning market value of equity.
DBPFR: 1 if PFR is disclosed before audit report date, 0 otherwise.
DAPFR: 1 if PFR is disclosed after audit report date, 0 otherwise.
DNOPFR: 1 if PFR is not disclosed, 0 otherwise.
DNEG: 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise.
SIZE: beginning market value of equity.
YD: year dummies.
***1% Signiﬁcance level.
* 10% Signiﬁcance level.
** 5% Signiﬁcance level.
Table 5
Market reaction to unexpected PFR earnings. Model: CARjt (1,0,1) = a1 + a2PUEjt + a3DBPFRPUEjt + a4DNEGPUEjt +
a5SIZEjt + a68YD + ejt.
Model Full sample
(n = 2187)
Full sample with
DBPUE (n = 2187)
Sub-sample with PFR release before
audit report date (n = 820)
Sub-sample with PFR release after
audit report date (n = 1241)
Intercept 0.077 (3.71)*** 0.076 (3.65)*** 0.080 (2.69)*** 0.072 (1.63)
PUE 0.001 (3.27)*** 0.001 (2.35)** 0.003 (2.98)*** 0.011 (1.64)
DBPFRPUE 0.002 (1.94)*
DNEGPUE 0.018 (5.55)*** 0.018 (5.42)*** 0.002 (4.33)*** 0.025 (3.26)***
SIZE 0.002 (3.30)*** 0.002 (3.25)*** 0.002 (2.41)*** 0.002 (1.39)
Adj R2 2.27% 2.23% 4.28% 3.17%
Max value was adjusted by average ± 3standard deviation.
CARjt (1,0,1): cumulative abnormal return from “day 1” to “day +1” of ﬁrm j at time t (“day 0” denotes the PFR release date).
PUEjt: unexpected PFR earnings (PFR NIjt – actual NIjt1) of ﬁrm j at time t deﬂated by beginning market value of equity.
DBPFR: 1 if PFR is disclosed before audit report date, 0 otherwise.
DNEG: 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise.
SIZE: beginning market value of equity.
YD: year dummies.
* 10% Signiﬁcance level.
** 5% Signiﬁcance level.
*** 1% Signiﬁcance level.
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2001). To address this concern, we deﬁne earnings surprise as the diﬀerence between PFR earnings and the
market expectation of net income, represented as the forecast consensus of analysts.
The second and third columns in Table 8 report the market reaction to PFR announcements of unexpected
net income (PUE1) based on the timing of their release into the market. Consistent with our prediction and the
result reported in Table 5, the estimated coeﬃcient on unexpected net income for the sub-sample that releases
PFRs before the audit report date is 0.151 and signiﬁcantly greater than zero at p < 0.01. For the sub-sample
Table 7
Eﬀect of ownership concentration on the informativeness of unexpected PFR earnings. Model: CARjt (1,0,1) = a1 + a2PUEjt +
a3DBPFRPUEjt + a4DBPFRPUEjtOWN + a5DNEGPUEjt + a6SIZEjt + a79YD + ejt.
Model Full sample with
DBPUE (n = 2187)
Sub-sample with PFR release before
audit report date (n = 820)
Sub-sample with PFR release after
audit report date (n = 1241)
Intercept 0.071 (3.40)*** 0.080 (2.55)** 0.050 (1.51)
PUE 0.015 (3.77)*** 0.012 (2.70)*** 0.016 (2.91)**
PUEOWN 0.001 (0.11) 0.025 (1.96)*
DBPFRPUE 0.001 (0.32)
DBPFRPUEOWN 0.0003 (0.03)
DNEGPUE 0.015 (4.35)*** 0.002 (3.34)*** 0.010 (2.21)**
SIZE 0.002 (3.11)*** 0.002 (2.36)** 0.001 (1.36)
Adj R2 2.55% 4.03% 1.32%
Max value was adjusted by average ±3standard deviation.
CARjt (1,0,1): cumulative abnormal return from “day 1” to “day +1” of ﬁrm j at time t (“day 0” denotes the PFR release date).
PUEjt: unexpected PFR earnings (PFR NIjt – actual NIjt1) of ﬁrm j at time t deﬂated by beginning market value of equity.
DBPFR: 1 if PFR is disclosed before audit report date, 0 otherwise.
OWN: 1 if the percentage of stocks held by the owner-largest shareholder is above the median of the sample ﬁrms, 0 otherwise.
DNEG: 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise.
SIZE: beginning market value of equity.
YD: year dummies.
* 10% Signiﬁcance level.
** 5% Signiﬁcance level.
*** 1% Signiﬁcance level.
Table 8
Market reaction to unexpected PFR (actual) earnings: alternative market expectation of earnings (Analysts’ Consensus).
Model Market reaction to unexpected PFR (PUE1) Market reaction to unexpected actual earnings (UE1)
Sub-sample with PFR
release before audit report
date (n = 331)
Sub-sample with PFR
release after audit report
date (n = 432)
Sub-sample with actual
earnings release before audit
report date (n = 331)
Sub-sample with actual
earnings release after audit
report date (n = 432)
Intercept 0.079 (2.11)** 0.004 (0.11) 0.007 (0.22) 0.020 (0.52)
PUE1 (or
UE1)
0.151 (2.73) *** 0.070 (1.27) 0.012 (0.19) 0.020 (0.65)
DNEGPUE1
(or UE1)
0.025 (0.32) 0.042 (0.57) 0.001 (0.33) 0.001 (0.73)
SIZE 0.003 (2.25)** 0.021 (0.56) 0.031 (0.08) 0.001 (0.73)
Adj R2 6.15% 0.39% 1.65% 0.39%
Max value was adjusted by average ±3standard deviation.
PUE1jt: unexpected PFR earnings (PFR NIjt – analysts’ consensus forecastjt) of ﬁrm j at time t deﬂated by beginning market value of
equity.
UE1jt: unexpected actual earnings (actual NIjt – analysts’ consensus forecastjt) of ﬁrm j at time t deﬂated by beginning market value of
equity.
*10% Signiﬁcance level.
** 5% Signiﬁcance level.
*** 1% Signiﬁcance level.
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greater than zero at conventional levels.
The last two columns in Table 8 report the results of estimating the regressions after dividing the sample
into two sub-groups, based on the timing of actual earnings disclosures before or after the audit report date.
The estimated coeﬃcient on unexpected actual earnings (UE1) for the sub-sample that releases PFRs before
(after) the audit report date is 0.012 (0.020) and not statistically greater than zero at the conventional
level. This ﬁnding suggests that actual earnings announcements convey no information to the market, whether
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that the regression coeﬃcient on the DAPFRUE interaction term in Table 6 is signiﬁcantly positive, suggest-
ing that reports of unexpected actual net income convey information to the market only when the audit report
date precedes the PFR release date. We attribute our Table 8 result to the possibility (subject to future veri-
ﬁcation) that the use of analysts’ consensus forecasts could limit the sample to mainly large ﬁrms with analyst
following, thereby reducing the statistical power of the test and inducing sample-selection bias.19 Considering
that ﬁrm size is positively related to the tendency to disclose alternative value-relevant information (Grant,
1980), the information content of earnings is anticipated by the market prior to the date of release.
6. Summary and conclusions
We analyze the timeliness of preliminary ﬁnancial reports (PFRs) in our sample of Korean ﬁrms, examining
the value of the informational content in these releases to the public domain. The results of this study indicate
that more than half of our sample ﬁrms released PFRs after their audit report dates. This ﬁnding raises con-
cerns that any ﬁnancial information released after the audit report dates could potentially be based on the
audited ﬁgures, which would mean that they could no longer be considered preliminary because external audit-
ing processes are substantially completed by the audit report date. Consistent with this analysis, our regression
results reveal that announcements of unexpected net income are only informative when they are disclosed
prior to the audit report date. Further analysis suggests that owner-largest shareholders do not play an impor-
tant role in determining the marginal eﬀects of PFRs disclosed before audit report dates.
Collectively, our ﬁndings have implications for accounting policymakers, who should pay increased atten-
tion to PFR reporting issues. The current regulation for PFRs in Korea may not be eﬀective in fulﬁlling its
main objective of pre-empting insider trading by getting information that would otherwise be privately held
into the public domain. To achieve this, it may be necessary to amend the current PFR regulation and require
that ﬁrms release PFRs well before independent auditors complete their audits.
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